Why Comply? An Analysis of Trends in Compliance with Judgments of the International Court of Justice Since Nicaragua by Jones, Heather L.
Chicago-Kent Journal of International and Comparative Law 
Volume 12 Issue 1 Article 3 
1-1-2012 
Why Comply? An Analysis of Trends in Compliance with 
Judgments of the International Court of Justice Since Nicaragua 
Heather L. Jones 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjicl 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Heather L. Jones, Why Comply? An Analysis of Trends in Compliance with Judgments of the International 
Court of Justice Since Nicaragua, 12 Chi.-Kent J. Int'l & Comp. Law 57 (2012). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjicl/vol12/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Journal of International and Comparative Law by an authorized 







An Analysis of T rends in Compliance 
with Judgments of the International 
Court of Justice since Nicaragua 
 
Heather L. Jones 
 
common destiny.  We can master it only if-we face it 




Table of Contents 
 
Introduction ................................................................................................58  
I.    ......................................................................59  
II.   Factors Affecting Compliance ............................................................60  
A. External Political Influence ..........................................................60  
1.  Pressure from the International Community .......................60  
2.  Presence of International Organizations..............................62  
3.  Reputation Costs .................................................................65  
B.    ........................................68  
1.  Shared Interest .....................................................................68  
2.  Close Relations ....................................................................69  
3.  Militarized Conflict .............................................................71  
C.  Substance of the Judgment ...........................................................72  
1.  Determinacy of Decision .....................................................72  
2.  Conflicting Self-Interest Principles .....................................74  
3.  Compromise and Cooperation .............................................76  
D.  Internal Political Influence ...........................................................79  
1.  Political Regime as an Excuse for Noncompliance .............79  
2.  A Look at the Merits: International v. Domestic .................81  
III.   Assessment .........................................................................................83  
IV.   Continuing the trend toward compliance ............................................85  
A.  External Political Influence as an Enforcer of International 
Judgments .........................................................................................85  
  
58 CHI.-KENT J. INT L & COMP. L. Vol. XII 





An Analysis of T rends in Compliance 
with Judgments of the International 
Court of Justice since Nicaragua 
 





substantial compliance with its judgments.  As will be discussed in Section 
II, outright defiance has not been asserted in any case; rather, in cases 
where total compliance was not achieved, the noncompliance was slight.  
The following four factors, discussed in Section III, contribute to such 
compliance: external political influence, the internal need for a definitive 
solution, the substance of the judgment issued, and internal political 
influence on compliance in four categories of cases: territorial disputes 
over sovereignty, territorial disputes over boundary lines, criminal 
procedure issues, and disputes over interpretation.  Lastly, Section V offers 
suggestions for continuing compliance trends. 
 Because many scholars have labeled Nicaragua 
- 2 this 
assessment considers only those cases that were adjudicated subsequent to 
that decision.  The aggregation of cases arbitrated from 1986 to the present3 
only contentious cases in which the ICJ ordered a judgment on the merits.4  
Neither advisory proceedings nor provisional measures were considered.  
                                                                                                                    
1 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 
27). 
2 Aloysius P. Llamzon, Jurisdiction and Compliance in Recent Decisions of the International Court of 
Justice, 18 EUR. J. INT L L. 815, 825 (2008) (quoting CONSTANZE SCHULTE, COMPLIANCE WITH 
DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 403 (Philippe Sands et al. eds., Oxford 
University Press 2004)). 
3 This article was completed in December 2010. 
4 See Appendix A for a list of included cases. 
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This paper excludes twelve post-Nicaragua cases that have not yet 
procured a judgment on the merits, as well as four cases where compliance 
with the judgments cannot yet be determined.5  Four additional cases that 
were discontinued without any prior judgment on the merits were likewise 
the joint request of the parties.6  Further, eighteen cases were excluded in 
which the claim was rejected on jurisdictional or admissibility grounds, or 
where there was no positive statement that could possibly imply a duty of 
acceptance and implementation.7 
 




8  In the modern era, there have been no 
cases of outright defiance where a respective respondent has deliberately, 
9  
Noncompliance, in the sense used here, requires more than initial 
disapproval; it requires a complete, unceasing refutation of the judgment 
from which the defiant party has not recanted. 
Although no state has been directly noncompliant of a modern era 
10  
Initial noncompliant behavior has been observed following a judgment in 
to accept it at the outset; but such instances are not cases of direct 
noncompliance because the refusal to comply eventually subsides.11  Cases 
of slight noncompliance exist where a party claims to comply with a 
decision, but does not take action to match its verbal commitment.12  Such 
behavior is likewise not directly noncompliant because there is no outward 
rejection of the decision.   
In some cases, implementation problems subsist that render parties 
bona fide 
                                                                                                                    
5 See Appendix B for a list of cases excluded from consideration. 
6 See id. 
7 See id. 
8 Llamzon, supra note 2, at 823. 
9 CONSTANZE SCHULTE, COMPLIANCE WITH DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 272 
(Philippe Sands et al. eds., Oxford University Press 2004). 
10 Id. at 436. 
11 See, e.g., Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6, at 18-19, 28 (Feb. 3); Land and Maritime 
Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), 2002 I.C.J. 303, at 6-7, 23 (Oct. 10), 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/94/7453.pdf. 
12 Id. 
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efforts to do so.  In these instances, failure to comply does not constitute 
noncompliance because it is a result of an inability to implement the 
decision rather than of defiant behavior by either party.   
 
I I . F actors Affecting Compliance 
 
Four factors determine the extent to which compliance will be 
achieved: external political influence, internal need for a definitive 
solution, the substance of the judgment issued, and internal political 
influence.  External political influence, such as pressure from the 
international community, involvement in international organizations, and 
reputation costs associated with defiant behavior, fosters compliance with 
ICJ judgments.  A second indicator of compliance is the presence of a 
genuine need for a definitive solution.  Whether such a need exists depends 
The last two indicators of compliance discussed, and the factors that incite 
the most problems for implementation, are the substance of the judgment 
issued and internal political influence.  Ambiguity in a judgment acts as a 
barrier to implementation, but as a result of inability rather than of bad 
faith.  A judgment that is in direct conflict with the self-interest of one or 
more parties may also be met with resistance, but states tend to comply 
nonetheless out of deference to the international regime.  An exception to 
this trend may arise where a judgment requires a state to take action that is 
contrary to domestic policy.  The extent to which such internal pressure 
will impede compliance and implementation depends on the merits of the 
judgment issued. 
 
A. External Political Influence 
 
External political influence is the extrinsic factor attributable to 
and the presence of international organizations contribute significantly to 
ensurin
costs associated with noncompliance, which often result from international 
affiliations, minimize the risk of defiant behavior. 
 
1. Pressure from the International Community 
 
Pressure from the international community is a significant factor in 
ensuring compliance with ICJ decisions.  International pressure, especially 
in the modern era of cases, plays a momentous role in the tendency of 
states to seek resolution of disputes in the ICJ and in ensuring compliance 
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once judgments are issued.  Pressure from the international community is 
such that, even in instances where a party fails to submit fully to the 
emergence of the international community as a prominent and reputable 
body in the modern era of the ICJ has acted as a penal force, furnishing 
consequences for states that fail to comply with  
re for 
membership within the international community generates pressure to act 
-abiding nation 
and consistent with our undertaking, I wish to ensure the international 
community that Namibia will abide by the verdict of the ICJ and respect it 
13  Such a statement depicts the propensity that many states have to 
preserve their effigy in international relations.  In some cases, especially 
those where noncompliance is suggested or anticipated, the pressure on the 
dispute between itself and Cameroon,14 the United States, France, and the 
United Kingdom subjected Nigeria to substantial diplomatic pressure to 
ensure compliance with the decision.15   
Observation of ICJ judgments as a result of international pressure 
is further exemplified in matters like the dispute between Libya and Chad 
regarding the Aouzou Strip,16 a case that resulted in initial noncompliance.  
to comply, as it could no longer stake a claim to the territory without 
risking regional and international consequences.  Subsequent acceptance of 
the judgment as legally binding secured peace between Libya and Chad 
after years of feuding; it affirmatively prevented Libya from claiming 
sovereignty over the disputed region.17  Some scholars have posited that 
international community for Libya as a law-abider in the wake of the 
judgment.18  Such an assertion further evidences the momentous influence 
the international community has on ensuring compliance. 
                                                                                                                    
13 Christof Maletsky, Kasikili KO, THE NAMBIAN (Dec. 14, 1999), available at 
http://allafrica.com/stories/199912140122.html. 
14 Cameroon v. Nigeria, 2002 I.C.J. 303.  
15 Llamzon, supra note 2, at 836. 
16 Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 3). 
17 Llamzon, supra note 2, at 832. 
18 Colter Paulson, Compliance with Judgments of the International Court of Justice since 1987, 98 AM. 
J. INT L L. 434, 443 (2004). 
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valid and necessary means for resolving disputes.  A dispute submitted to 
the Court by Hungary and Slovakia is illustrative.19  The case revolved 
-Nagymaros Project, a project solidified by a treaty 
between the two states.20  Hungary abandoned the project;21 but even so, 
the implications of the international treaty prompted Hungary to first 
submit the dispute to the ICJ, rather than baldly defy its obligations under 
the agreement.22  Such an act affirms the influence that the international 
community and the presence of international agreements can have on 
settling disputes between states. 
 
2. Presence of International Organizations 
 
Article 94(1) of the United Nations Charter articulates member 
rtakes to comply with the 
23 
The importance of active involvement in international 
organizations as a means for ensuring compliance with ICJ decisions is 
perhaps best shown in the previously mentioned case involving the Bakassi 
Peninsula.24  
decision to award the disputed territory to Cameroon, despite initially 
rejecting it, largely due to the active efforts of United Nations.25  Following 
community exerted substantial pressure on Nigeria to comply, with the 
judgments are binding and not subject to appeal.  Nigeria has an obligation 
26  Through 
intensive mediation efforts,27 
eroon and 
                                                                                                                    
19 -Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25). 
20 Id. ¶¶ 15-22.  
21 Id. 
22 Special Agreement for Submission to the International Court of Justice of the Differences Between 
-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 7 Apr. 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1293 
(1993). 
23 U.N. Charter art. 94, ¶ 1. 
24 See Cameroon v. Nigeria, 2002 I.C.J. 303 (Oct. 10). 
25 Sara McLaughlin Mitchell & Paul R. Hensel, International Institutions and Compliance with 
Agreements, 51 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 721, 725 (October 2007). 
26 Paulson, supra note 18, at n. 203 (citing Agence F rance-Presse, Doc. FBIS-AFR-2002-1025 (25 Oct. 
2002)). 
27 Press Release, U.N. AFR/1397 (Cameroon), Nigeria Sign Agreement Ending Decades-Old Border 
Dispute (June 12, 2006). 
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28 At the request of both states, the United Nations set up a 
29  
Likewise, in the dispute between El Salvador and Honduras over 
their land frontier, the legal status of maritime spaces, and sovereignty over 
certain islands,30 
following the decision and announced its intention to accept and comply 
with its obligations under Article 94(1).31  Even when accusations of 
defiance arose,32 
judgment and worked with international organizations to ensure that they 
achieved satisfactory compliance.33  
In some cases, the presence of international organizations allows 
for the resolution of a dispute without a judgment.  For example, in the case 
regarding the binding nature of an arbitral award on the maritime 
boundaries of Guinea-Bissau and Senegal, a final judgment on the 
delimitation of the maritime zone in question was never necessary because 
the parties reached a compromise.34  An international agency for joint 
implementa
the cooperation was to break down.35   
Aside from the significance of international organizations in 
forging compliance with decisions, their presence, like pressure from the 
international community, is also a significant moving force in validating 
the legitimacy of such organizations and codifying the authority of the ICJ 
to arbitrate international disputes.  The LaGrand36 and Avena37 cases, 
                                                                                                                    
28 Kolade Larewaju, UN Panel on Bakassi Meets Dec. 1, VANGUARD (LAGOS), Nov. 29, 2002, 
available at http://allafrica.com/stories/2002111290035.html. 
29 Shakirat Abdulmajeed, Bakassi Committee to Demarcate Border Set Up, DAILYTRUST (AUJA), Dec. 
4, 2002, available at http://www.allafrica.com. 
30 Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.), 1992 I.C.J. 348 (Sep. 11). 
31 Joint Communique of the Presidents of El Salvador and Honduras of 11 September 1992, 38 
 
32 
Honduras to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2000/1142 (Dec. 1, 
2002). 
33 Id.; see also Nikki Tait,  El Salvador Falls to Quash Border Ruling, FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 19, 
2003, at 11.   
34 Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), 1991 I.C.J. 53 (Nov. 12). 
35 Protocol of agreement relating to the organization and operation of the agency for management and 
cooperation between the Republic of Guinea-Bissau and the Republic of Senegal instituted by the 
Agreement of 14 October 1993, U.N. LOS BULL., No. 31, 42-58 (1996) (the parties undertook to 
establish this agency in Article 4 of the 1993 agreement). 
36 LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 4 Judgment (June 27), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/104/7736.pdf.  
37 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 12 Judgment (Feb. 3), available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/128/8188.pdf.  
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a Convention on 
Consular Relations,38 provide examples.  Both disputes were initiated and 
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, which the parties ratified39 as a result 
of membership in the United Nations.  Likewise, the recognition of an 
international tribunal like the ICJ can foster compliance in and of itself, as 
seen in the Sipadan-Ligitan Case.40  Following an award of the disputed 
islands to Malaysia, the Indonesian Embassy announced that it would 
honor the obligation created by its submission to the Court and accept the 
decision as final and binding.41 
The role of international organizations is brought full circle by 
considering cases like the dispute between Congo and Belgium over the 
legality of an arrest warrant issued by Belgium against a foreign minister of 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo.42  Because the dispute was 
premised on alleged crimes against humanity and breaches of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Additional Protocols I and II,43 
Member State status accounted for the submission of the dispute to the ICJ.  
international warrant in question was interpreted in light of elucidations 
emplo
as established by the international community and sustained by 
international organizations.44   
The case also illustrates how the presence of and pressure from 
the warrant, and made the required notifications on the day after the Court 
international organization of which it is a part.45  Further, in 1993, Belgium 
                                                                                                                    
38 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. 
39 Harry S. Clark, III, Note, Determining the Remedy for Violations of Article 36 of the VCCR: Review 
and Reconsideration of the Clemency Process After Avena, 38 GEO. WASH. INT L L. REV. 131, 149 
(2006).   
40 Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/ Malaysia), 2002 I.C.J. 625 Judgment 
(Dec. 17), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/102/7714.pdf.  
41 Press Release, Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Republic of Indonesia, Following the Decision by 
the International Court of Justice on the Sipadan-Ligitan Case,  (Dec. 17, 2002),  available at 
http://home.xtra.co.nz/hosts/indonesianembassy/PressRelease737-04-xii-2002.htm. 
42 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3 Judgment (Feb. 14), 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/121/8126.pdf.  
43 Leen De Smet & Frederik Naert, Making or Breaking International Law? An International Law 
Humanitarian Law, 35 REVUE BELGE DE DRIOT INTERNATIONAL 471, 491 (2002). 
44 See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, supra note 42, ¶¶ 51-58. 
45 SCHULTE, supra note 9, at 269. 
  
No. 1 Why Comply? 65 
made fundamental changes to its laws on universal jurisdiction,46 
complying with its obligations under Article 94(1) and acting in conformity 
47  
absent the coercive power of the international regime as a means for 
ensuring that judgments are executed. 
 
3. Reputation Costs 
 
Reputation costs promote compliance in a manner similar to 
international community pressure and the presence of international 
organizations.  When states resolve contentious issues with the assistance 
of international institutions, they are more likely to comply with 
ag
48  Active involvement with international 
organizations increases the prospects for compliance by raising reputation 
costs for reneging,49 and pressure from the international community 
threatens reputational injury to states that circumvent ICJ judgments.50  For 
territorial dispute with Chad, it eventually negotiated with Chad to reach an 
agreement for implementation.51  
52   
Cases like the dispute between El Salvador and Honduras further 
regime.  Honduran allegations of Salvadoran misconduct and continuing 
fulfilling its obligation to execute the judgment reasonably and in good 
53  Notwithstanding that allegation, however, El Salvador has 
continued to publicly avow its acceptance of and compliance with the 
to comply 
with the judgment initially, reputation costs associated with noncompliance 
provoked the state to at least portray compliance to the international 
                                                                                                                    
46 Id. at 271. 
47 Id. 
48 Mitchell & Hensel, supra note 25, at 725. 
49 Beth A. Simmons & Daniel J. Hopkins, International Law and State Behavior: Commitment ansd 
Compliance in International Monetary Affairs, 94 AM. POL. SCI. R. 819, 828 (2000). 
50 Llamzon, supra note 2, at 832. 
51 Letter dated 13 Apr. 1994 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, U.N. Doc. S/1994/432, (13 Apr. 1994). 
52 Libya Prepared to Withdraw from Aouzou Strip, JANA NEWS AGENCY (TRIPOLI), Mar. 10, 1994, 
available at http://ww w.ibru.dur.ac.uk. 
53 Llamzon, supra note 2, at 828.   
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community  a representation that in fact has effectuated compliance with 
 considerable extent,54 even if inadvertently. 
The influence of reputation can also be seen in more recent 
disputes, like that between Bosnia and Serbia regarding the prevention and 
punishment of the crime of genocide.55  The Court found that Serbia had 
failed to prevent genocide and had flouted its obligations under the 
genocide convention by failing to punish the perpetrators.56 The Court 
ordered Serbia to take immediate steps to detain wartime leader Radovan 
Karadzic and military commander Ratko Mladic for transfer to the United 
57  The European Union announced 
were detained, amplifying the reputational risks at stake for 
noncompliance.58  As ordered, Karadzic was arrested in Belgrade in July 
2008.59  Although Mladic had not been arrested as of October 22, 2010, 
Belgrade avowed commitment to arresting him in accordance with the 
judgment.60  That commitment was honored in May 2011, when Serbian 
war-crimes officials captured Mladic and delivered him to The Hague to 
stand trial.61  The European Council formally made Serbia a candidate for 
membership in the European Union on March 1, 2012,62 following 
ffairs 
recommended that Serbia be granted candidate status.63 
The recently adjudicated dispute between Malaysia and Singapore 
over sovereignty of Pedra Branca64 shows how reputation costs promote 
compliance, even where the decision is viewed as unfavorable to one or 
both sides.  It further exemplifies the clout of political pressure to instill 
deference beyond mere ICJ judgments, but also for the ICJ procedure.  The 
                                                                                                                    
54 Id. 
55 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & 
Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 1996 I.C.J. 595 (July 11). 
56 Alexandra Hudson, Serbia Cleared of Genocide, REUTERS (Feb. 27, 2007), available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/02/26/idUSL26638724._CH_.2400.   
57 Id. 
58 Dan Bilefsky and Doreen Caravajal, Europe Tested as War Crimes Suspect Remains F ree, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 22, 2010, at A1.  
59 Profile: Ratko Mladic, BBC NEWS (Jul. 31, 2008), available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1423551.stm.   
60 Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/ Malaysia), 2002 I.C.J. 625 Judgment 
(Dec. 17). 
61 Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Arrest of Ratko Mlad
Press Release SC/10265 (May 27, 2011); Press Release, U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General 
Significant Step  Towards Ending Impunity, SG/SM/13601 (May 26, 2011). 
62 Press Release, European Council, Serbia is granted EU candidate status (Mar. 1, 2012). 
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Court ruled that Pedra Branca is un
decision, the Malaysian Foreign Minister later said that his country had 
renewed its search for documents that it asserts would allow it autonomy 
over Pedra Branca.65  In making the assertion, the Foreign Minister cited to 
a rule of the ICJ which allows for a case to be reviewed if new evidence is 
ascertained within ten years of the judgment.66  This demonstrates the 
reverence that states have, not only for the judgments the Court hands 
down, but also for the modus operandi that the ICJ employs. 
Proactive consideration of reputational effects as a factor in 
compliance is not limited to concern for international reputation costs 
alone.  Following Indonesi
Sipadan-Ligitan case, for example, the Indonesian Embassy expressed hope 
that its positive reception to the decision would set a precedent in the 
Southeast Asian region and serve as an example for future interactions 
among countries in the region.67  
attributed in part to the recognition of the effect that noncompliance could 
have in future bargaining situations, not only on itself, but on the region as 
a whole.  Indonesia set a standard for compliance that raised, if not 
established, the reputation costs of noncompliance in the adjudication and 
resolution of future disputes by and between Southeast Asian countries. 
Factors of external political influence are, more often than not, 
intertwined.  For example, reconsider the previously discussed maritime 
boundary dispute between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal.  Following the 
award, Senegal demanded compliance by Guinea-Bissau, but was impeded 
by Guinea- as unenforceable on 
substantive and procedural grounds.68  Despite Guinea-
however, obligatory pressure derived from the international community and 
the ubiquity of international organizations heightened the reputation costs 
                                                                                                                    
65 See Malaysia, Singapore to accept ICJ's ruling on island, THE STAR (April 18, 2008), available at 
http://thestar.com 
.my/news/story.asp?file=/2008/4/18/courts/20991877&sec=courts; ICJ's ruling on Pedra Branca 
delivered on May 23, CHANNEL NEWSASIA (April 30, 2008), available at 
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocal news/view/344623/1/.html. 
66 Malaysia not giving up hope on Batu Puteh yet, THE STAR (June 1, 2008), available at 
http://thestar.com.my/new 
s/story.asp?file=/2008/6/1/nation/21421939&sec=nation. 
67 Press Release, Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Republic of Indonesia, supra note 41. 
68 Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/ Malaysia), 2002 I.C.J. 625 at 56-57 ¶ 
10 Judgment (Dec. 17). 
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associated with noncompliance and prompted Guinea-Bissau to initiate 





elements between states that most readily create a need to solve a dispute 
are shared interests in resolution, close relations, and military conflicts.  
States are more likely to seek resolution through the ICJ and abide by the 
 if they have a shared policy interest in resolving the 
dispute or engage in close political or economic relations, or if there are 
existing or anticipated military conflicts.  Judgments under such 
circumstances have not been met with defiance in the modern era.  
 
1. Shared Interest 
 
In each of the internationally adjudicated disputes in the modern 
era in which a judgment has been reached, the parties have had some 
ared interest often goes 
beyond a mere mutual interest in resolution.  Rather, there exists some 
mutually collective concern that would benefit from, be addressed by, or be 
improved upon by dispute settlement.  A judgment therefore 
accommodates both parties with respect to that mutual interest, even if the 
decision is more favorable to one party than the other. 
In the Kasikili/Sedudu Island case,70 for example, the need to 
resolve the issue of sovereignty over the territory was expedited by 
Botswana and Nami
 an effort that had been complicated by the dispute.71  Likewise in the 
-Nagymaros Project case, the bi-national venture at issue 
involved a joint investment by Hungary and Slovakia for the shared 
purpose of developing energy and navigation and protecting against 
floods.72  Another illustrative example is the dispute between Malaysia and 
Indonesia over the Spidan and Ligitan islands, which are home to 
ecosystems that contain more than 3,000 species of fish and hundreds of 
                                                                                                                    
69 See Maritime Delimitation between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal) 
Application Instituting Proceedings (Mar. 12, 1991) available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/85/6843.pdf. 
70 Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots./Namib.), (Dec. 13, 1999) Judgment, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/98/7577.pdf.  
71 SCHULTE, supra note 9, at 250. 
72 Id. at 240. 
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73 Such ecosystems require administrative 
actions for their preservation, like the issuance of protective ordinances, 
which require that sovereignty be established in one state.74 
Parties may also have a mutually shared interest in preventing a 
harmful rift in their relations.  The case between Argentina and Uruguay 
regarding the construction of pulp mills on the Uruguay River75 sought to 
settle an economic and public relations rift between those states with 
tourism and transportation industries that were affected.76  In the territorial 
dispute between Libya and Chad, the states had shared economic and 
political interests in avoiding a direct confrontation, as Chad could have 
lost its economic help from Libya by publicizing Libyan adventurism in the 
region.77 
Mutually shared resources also expedite the need for settlement.  
The dispute over sovereignty in the area between Greenland and Jan 
Mayen, for example, stemmed from a common interest in obtaining and 
protecting marine resources relied upon by the populations of Denmark78 
and Norway.79 This impelled both states to delimitate the continental shelf 
and fishery zones so that the shared resources could be properly conserved 
and allocated.  Similarly in the Pedra Branca case, Malaysia and Singapore 
had a shared economic interest in fishing and shipping in the contested 
territory.80  Likewise in the dispute between Qatar and Bahrain, shared 
economic interests in petroleum, gas resources, and tourism in the area 
incited the need for a definitive solution.81 
 
2. Close Relations 
 
                                                                                                                    
73 Fabio Spadi, Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan: New Parameters for the Concept of Dependency in 
the Maritime Environment? The ICJ judgment of 17 December 2002
310 (2003). 
74 Press Release, Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Republic of Indonesia, supra note 41. 
75 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment (Apr. 20, 2010), available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/15877.pdf.  
76 Helsingin Sanomat, Pulp mill dispute between Argentina and Uruguay intensifies, HELSINGIN 




78 Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), 1993 
I.C.J. 38 (June 14), at 44-46, ¶¶ 13-14. 
79 Id. at 71, ¶ 74. 
80 Zakir Hussain, Both sides agree on aid to ships, fishing: S'pore, Malaysia to cooperate on safety and 
security issues in area, conduct joint survey works, THE STRAITS TIMES (June 7, 2008), available at 
http://www.straitstimes.com/Free/Story/STIStory_245192.html. 
81 Gulf Centre for Strategic Studies, A New Dawn in Bahrain-Qatar Relations, BAHRAIN BRIEF, VOL. 2 
ISSUE 4 (2001), http://www.bahrainbrief.gcss-eg.org/english/april-issue2001.htm.  
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Where a close relationship exists, whether based on economics, 
cultural ties, history, or amiability, states are more likely to submit 
themselves to the ICJ and observe any judgment it devises.  For example, 
during the proceedings over the Kasikili/Sedudu Island, Namibia and 
Botswana each stressed their commitments to good relations with one 
other.82  Because of those good relations, both states were interested in a 
83  Likewise in the Sipadan-Ligitan dispute, bilateral 
relations between Indonesia and Malaysia prompted the two states to 
commit to a peaceful dispute settlement.84  The Indonesian Embassy stated 
that such a commitment, which was largely attributed to the prompt and 
interaction between the two States
85  
A similar interest existed more recently in the Pulp Mills on the Uruguay 
River case, where the economic and public relations rift caused by the 
dispute tainted otherwise amicable relations between Argentina and 
Uruguay.86  Prior to the dispute, the parties shared many historical and 
cultural ties, and both states sought a quick resolution of the issue in order 
to prevent an unprecedented feud.87   
This theme is consistent in cases in the modern era, as well as pre-
Nicaragua.  Good relations between disputing states encourage fast 
resolution and compliance, especially when those relations involve trade, 
industry, or some other fiscal endeavor.  It does not follow, however, that 
conflicting relations between countries promote noncompliance.  In the 
case of the boundary issue between Qatar and Bahrain,88 for instance, the 
boundary dispute had soured the relations between the countries for 
decades.89  Rath
offered a solution to the rift, ushered in a new era of cooperation between 
the two states, and strengthened ties throughout the region.90 
                                                                                                                    
82 See Statement of Albert Kawana on Behalf of Namibia before the Court on 15 Feburary 1999, CR 
99/01; Statement of Molosiwa L. Selepeng on behalf of Botswana before the Court on 22 February 
1999, CR 99/06. 
18/icjwww/idocket/ibona/ibonacr/bona_icr9906_19990222.html). 
83 SCHULTE, supra note 9, at 253. 
84 Press Release, Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Republic of Indonesia, supra note 41. 
85 Id. 
86 See Center for Human Rights and Environment, Paper Pulp Mills, available at 
http://www.cedha.org.ar/en/initiatives/paper_pulp_ mills.   
87 Id.  
88 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), 
Judgment (Mar. 16, 2001), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/87/6995.pdf. 
89 See 24 Middle East Executive Reports (2002), No. 1, 8, Qatar-Bahrain Border Dispute ended by 
World Court ruling. 
90 SCHULTE, supra note 9, at 239. 
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3. Militarized Conflict 
 
Fears of noncompliance often arise in disputes where military 
clashes are present.  In spite of what seems to be substantial grounds for 
concern, such fears are unfounded.91  Instead, armed clashes tend to induce 
the submission of international disputes to the arbitration of the ICJ,92 and 
furthermore, the judgments rendered often foster cooperation and 
friendship between previously feuding states.  This was seen in the dispute 
between Qatar and Bahrain, in which the Court settled a centuries-old 
dispute between the countries that had been descri
93   
In the dispute between El Salvador and Honduras over their land 
frontier, the legal status of maritime spaces, and sovereignty over certain 
islands, problems in implementation were foreseen from the outset due to 
hostility and conflict between the countries.94  Each state, however, 
instantaneously announced that it would accept the decision.95  Even as 
96 both states accepted the 
and proceeded to eradicate hostilities and work to 
implement the decision.  Similarly, in the dispute between Libya and Chad, 
fears that Libya would refuse to remove its military force were also 
unfounded.  Libya withdrew its troops from the area in question, in spite of 
97  The judgment has since 
been recognized as an important factor in concluding the widespread 
military activity that previously existed in the region.98   
This trend has continued in recent cases.  Maritime delimitation in 
the Black Sea99 further exemplifies that even where conflict exists or is 
anticipated, a judgment can not only end the possibility of conflict, but can 
                                                                                                                    
91 Id. at 273. 
92 Llamzon, supra note 2, at 835 
93 SCHULTE, supra note 9, at 234. 
94 Llamzon, supra note 2, at 826. 
95 Id. 
96 See Application for Revision of the Judgment of 11 Sept. 1992 in the Case Concerning the Land, 
Island, and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua Intervening) (El Salvador v. 
Honduras), 2003 ICJ Rep 392 (Dec. 18). 
97 Id. at 273. 




99 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Rom. v. Ukr.), Judgment (Feb. 3, 2009), available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/132/14987.pdf. 
  
72 CHI.-KENT J. INT L & COMP. L. Vol. XII 
judgment regarding the disputed boundary, Ukrainian President Viktor 
sectors of the bilateral cooperation b 100   
As these examples illustrate, modern era cases suggest that the 
presence of military conflict between parties to a dispute poses no threat to 
compliance, but rather provides for it.  Additionally, even in situations 
where militarized conflict is neither present nor anticipated, a desire to 
maintain peace and prevent any such conflict from arising can be a factor 
of effective dispute resolution.  Following the Sipadan-Ligitan case, for 
example, Indonesia expressed relief that 
possibility of an armed conflict and the potential losses resulting from 
101 
and pr 102 The threat of armed conflict can thus serve as a 
motive for compliance, even between countries with a historically amicable 
relationship.  
 
C . Substance of the Judgment 
 
The third factor affecting compliance, and one of the most 
significant in achieving it, is the substance of the judgment itself.  Elements 
of the judgment that most readily effect compliance are the determinacy of 
the decision, the presence of compromise and cooperation, and whether the 
decision is in conflict with the self-interest of one or more of the parties.  In 
self-interest cultivate the most problems for implementation, but states 
comply with such decisions nonetheless.  On the other hand, judgments that 
entail compromise or allow for cooperative efforts are generally 
implemented with ease. 
   
1. Determinacy of Decision 
 
In the dispute between El Salvador and Honduras, the slight 
noncompliance was largely attributable to the uncertainty left by the 
103  The jurisdictional boundary mandated by the ICJ was 
                                                                                                                    
100 Yuschenko: UN International Court Of Justice's Decision On Delimitation Of Black Sea Shelf 
Between Ukraine And Romania Just, UKRAINIAN NEWS AGENCY (February 5, 2009), available at 
http://un.ua/eng/article/178853.html. 
101 Press Release, Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Republic of Indonesia, supra note 41. 
102 Id. 
103 Llamzon, note 2, at 828. 
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confused for some time, with both Nicaragua and El Salvador appearing to 
misinterpret the point at the mouth of the gulf where Honduran waters 
ended.104  In considering such obstacles to implementation, especially in 
cases deemed as encountering noncompliance, it is important to note that 
delays which are not attributable to bad faith on either side do not 
constitute noncompliance in a strict sense.  In the preceding case, for 
example, failure to implement the special agreement and demarcate the 
boundary appears to be more a problem of allocation of resources and 
practical issues, than of bad faith or resistance by either party.105 
Another case that is illustrative of ambiguity acting as a barrier to 
-Nagymaros Project 
case.106  In its judgment, the Court refrained from making any specific 
orders and instead imposed a duty on Hungary and Slovakia to negotiate 
ng the judgment in good faith.107  The 
108  Prior 
to the case, the issue of sovereignty between Indonesia and Malaysia could 
not be overcome because of inconsistent written legal conventions and state 
practices handed down from the British and Dutch colonial authorities in 
1891.109  Thus, the inability to resolve the dispute was not caused by a 
failure to negotiate or cooperate, but rather by the existence of a legal 
doctrine which was open to various interpretations.110 
These circumstances are indicative of the problems that confront 
disputing parties following an ambiguous judgment.  The states are often 
unable to use the judgment to resolve their differences,111 not because they 
refuse to comply, but because of a lack of direction on how to do so.  As 
such, assessing compliance in accord with judgments is especially 
difficult.112  It does not follow, however, that the presence of the aforesaid 
issues in implementation are signs of direct noncompliance.  Rather, such 
instances stand for the proposition that determinant decisions cultivate 
compliance, whereas ambiguous decisions act as an obstacle to it. 
While it is possible to procure compliance with a judgment in spite 
of ambiguity, discontent with this approach has been noted.  To settle the 
                                                                                                                    
104 Id. at 828, n. 82. 
105 SCHULTE, supra note 9, at 274-75. 
106 See -Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25). 
107 Special Agreement for Submission to the International Court of Justice of the Differences Between 
Them Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), 32 I.L.M. (1993) 1293, 144-
145 (Apr. 7).  
108 Llamzon, supra note 2, at 834. 
109 Press Release, Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Republic of Indonesia, supra note 41. 
110 Id. 
111 Llamzon, supra note 2, at 835. 
112 Id. at 834. 
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dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras over demarcation in the 
Caribbean Sea, the Court ordered the states to negotiate the course of the 
line between the existing endpoint of the land boundary in the mouth of the 
Coco River and the starting point determined in the judgment in good 
faith.113  
s,114 rather than ruling on the 
course itself, has met criticism.115  
 
2. Conflicting Self-Interest Principles 
 
As expected, another challenge to compliance occurs when a 
judgment is in direct conflict with the self-interest of one or more of the 
parties involved.  Although unfavorable decisions may spur noncompliance 
initially, the modern era of cases has shown significant state deference to 
the role of the ICJ as an arbitrator in the settlement of international 
disputes.  The following cases support the premise that states will comply 
with judgments even when they are contrary to their national interests.116 
Recall the Bakassi Peninsula dispute between Cameroon and 
Nigeria.  The Lake Chad basin contains significant resources,117 and the 
Bakassi Peninsula has been an even greater source of tension because of its 
vast oil resources.118  In its judgment, the Court awarded Cameroon the 
Lake Chad boundary, 30 villages, and the Bakassi Peninsula.119  The order 
-interest principles, and, not 
surprisingly, Nigeria issued an official statement following the decision 
120  Both parties 
acknowledged the substantial economic benefits available to the prevailing 
party, and the intensity of those benefits required considerably more 
assistance for compliance.  Although coming to an agreement was more 
121 that relied on the 
                                                                                                                    
113 Territorial and Maritime Dispute Between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicar. v. 
Hond.) 2007 I.C.J. 659,  ¶ 321(4) (Oct. 8). 
114 Id. 
115 Yuschenko: UN International Court Of Justice's Decision On Delimitation Of Black Sea Shelf 
Between Ukraine And Romania Just, supra note 100. 
116 SCHULTE, supra note 9, at 273. 
117 International Court Poised to Rule on Nigeria-Cameroon Border Dispute, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 
Doc. FBIS-AFR-2002-1009 (Oct. 9, 2002).   
118 Nigeria Hands Bakassi to Cameroon, BBC NEWS REPORT (Aug. 14, 2006), available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4789647.stm. 
119 Cameroon: Bakassi : Why the ICJ Judgment is Unacceptable Government, AFRICA NEWS SERVICE 
(Oct. 24, 2002), available in Lexis, News Library, Allnews file. 
120 Id. 
121 See Cameroon Nigeria Sign Agreement Ending Decades-Old Border Dispute, UN Press Release 
AFR/1397 (June 12, 2006). 
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negotiations by a Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission established by the 
United Nations.  - 122 eventual 
compliance was achieved and the Bakassi Peninsula was peaceably 
-interest in retaining 
123  United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 
the viability of a peaceful and legal settlement of border disputes, when it is 
done with the full support of the international community and in a spirit of 
124 
case and the Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan Islands case also created a 
significant conflict to the self-interest of one of the disputing parties.125  In 
each case, both states had an economic interest in developing tourism 
infrastructure in the disputed area, and neither country could proceed until 
sovereignty had been decided.126  
over the Kasikili/Sedudu Island was awarded entirely to Botswana, and 
sovereignty over the Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan Islands was awarded 
to Indonesia.  Although the awards clearly diverged from Namibia and 
 
Another example is the recent case between Romania and 
Ukraine,127 in which Romania was awarded a piece of land that contained 
considerable natural gas and petrol depositories and was significantly larger 
and more rich in resources than an adjacent piece of terrain awarded to 
Ukraine.128  
in the United Nations International Court, nearly all of the available oil and 
gas reserves were concentrated in the part of the sea shelf granted to 
                                                                                                                    
122 Agreement Between the Republic of Cameroon and the Federal Republic of Nigeria Concerning the 
Modalities of Withdrawal and Transfer of Authority in the Bakassi Peninsula, Cameroon-Nigeria, 
(Greentree Agreement) UNTS Registration No. I-45354 (June 12, 2006). 
123 Nigeria Hands Bakassi to Cameroon, BBC NEWS REPORT (Aug. 14, 2006), available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ africa/4789647.stm; Nigeria hands over control of Bakassi Peninsula, THE 
HAGUE JUSTICE PORTAL (Aug. 14, 2008), available at 
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=9635. 
124 Press Release, UN Secretary-General, Agreement Transferring Authority over Bakassi Peninsula 
from Nigeria to Cameroon Triumph for the Rule of Law,  Secretary-General Says in Message for 
Ceremony, SG/SM/11745 AFR/1737 (Aug. 14, 2008). 
125 Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/ Malaysia), 2002 I.C.J. 625 Judgment 
(Dec. 17). 
126 SCHULTE, supra note 9, at 249-50. 
127 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Rom. v. Ukr.), Judgment (Feb. 3, 2009). 
128 EU's Black Sea Border Set in Stone, EUOBSERVER (Feb. 3, 2009), available at 
http://euobserver.com/24/27525. 
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Romania.129  Nonetheless, the line drawn was considered equitable between 
both parties and both have thus far complied.130 
The tendency of compliance in instances where judgments favor 
-
alone.  As discussed in the following section, cooperation is the primary 
means by which such decisions are eventually implemented. 
 
3. Compromise and Cooperation 
 
Decisions that represent a compromise between the wants of both 
states are more eagerly and easily complied with.  In the boundary dispute 
between Qatar and Bahrain, for example, the countries had a shared 
economic interest in resolving the maritime and territorial issues.  The 
-standing dispute that 
131  The boundary defined by 
the Court over the disputed territories was a compromise, and each party 
considered itself a winner as a result.132 This ensured compliance, despite 
the existence of centuries-old feuds between the states.133  Similarly, in the 
boundary dispute between Romania and the Ukraine,134 
judgment allocated a larger portion of the disputed area to Romania, but it 
divided the marine area of the Black Sea along a line that was between the 
claims of each country and was therefore seen as equitable and 
acceptable.135 
In some instances, a mutual interest between the parties may foster 
cooperation without an explicit Court order.  Recall Malaysia and 
Pedra Branca.  The states agreed to establish a technical sub-committee to 
oversee the conduct of joint survey works to prepare the way for talks on 
maritime issues in and around the area.   The states also agreed that if any 
incident occurred in and around the waters of Pedra Branca, Middle Rocks 
and South Ledge, either side would provide humanitarian assistance to the 
                                                                                                                    
129 Ukraine gets bulk of oil, gas reserves in delimitation dispute with Romania, says commissioner to 
international court, INTERFAX-UKRAINE (Feb. 3, 2009), available at 
http://www.interfax.com.ua/eng/main/7163/. 
130 EU's Black Sea Border Set in Stone, supra note 128. 
131 Gulf Centre for Strategic Studies, A New Dawn in Bahrain-Qatar Relations, BAHRAIN BRIEF, VOL. 2 
ISSUE 4 (2001), available at http://www.bahrainbrief.gcss-eg.org/english/april-issue2001.htm. 
132 SCHULTE, supra note 9, at 238. 
133 Id. at 234. 
134 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Rom. v. Ukr.), Judgment (Feb. 3, 2009). 
135 Press Release, International Court of Justice, The Court establishes the single maritime boundary 
delimiting the continental shelf and exclusive economic zones of Romania and Ukraine, (Feb. 3, 2009), 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/132/14985.pdf. 
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vessels involved.136 The result of this cooperative effort was a solution that 
was advantageous to both states, allowing both Malaysian and Singaporean 
fishermen to continue traditional fishing activities in those waters.137   
States frequently engage in cooperative efforts through their own 
initiatives as a means of implementing a decision of the Court.  In the case 
of whether an arbitral award on the maritime boundaries of Guinea-Bissau 
and Senegal was binding,138 both states expressed a new willingness to 
search for a comprehensive 
judgment.139  After engaging in new negotiations premised by a desire for 
cooperation, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal concluded a management and 
cooperation agreement that provided for joint exploration of a specifically 
delimited maritime zone,140 resulting in an equitable compromise that was 
suitable to both parties.141  Consider also the case concerning the maritime 
delimitation of the area between Greenland and Jan Mayen,142 where 
Denmark and Norway negotiated their own delimitation coordinates and 
formally agreed on them, rather than implementing the delimitation 
coordinates indicated by the Court.143  Further, the agreement reached post-
judgment regulated a sovereignty issue that was not touched on at all by the 
ecision.144   
The trend in pursuing negotiations as a means to achieve 
the Pulp Mills dispute.  Although the judgment was only recently handed 
down,145 Argentina and Uruguay have engaged in extensive negotiations in 
substantial observance to date.146   
Post-judgment implementation discussions are not only common, 
but may be dictated by the judgment itself, as in the recent case regarding 
the territorial and maritime dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the 
                                                                                                                    
136 Hussain, supra note 80. 
137 Id. 
138 Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), 1991 I.C.J. 53 (Nov. 12). 
139 SCHULTE, supra note 9, at 227. 
140 Management and Cooperation Agreement, Senegal-Guinea-Bissau, 14 October 1993, available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/unts/120001_144071/18/6/00014934.pdf. 
141 MAURICE KAMTO, Le contentieux de la frontier maritime entre la Guinee-Bissau et le Senegal, 101 
RGDIP (1997), translated in SCHULTE, supra note 9, at 358-74. 
142 Maritime delimitation in the area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), 1993 
I.C.J. 38 (June 14). 
143 SCHULTE, supra note 9, at 325-47. 
144 Id. at 223 (the exploitation of possible transboundary oil and gas fields). 
145 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment (Apr. 20, 2010). 
146 Panos Merkouris, Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay): Of 
, THE HAGUE JUSTICE PORTAL (July 15, 
2010), http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/eCache/DEF/11/878.html. 
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Caribbean Sea.147  The Court drew the boundary line and ordered the 
countries to negotiate in good faith the course of the line between the 
existing endpoint of the land boundary in the mouth of the Coco River and 
the starting point determined in the judgment.148  To date, negotiations have 
allowed the states to agree on the course.149 As previously discussed, 
however, such an open-ended assignment can be troublesome.  Recall, for 
-Nagymaros Project case.  The parties began 
implementation discussions immediately following the 1997 judgment,150 
but negotiations broke down when Slovakia asserted that Hungary was not 
negotiating in good faith.151 
As these cases demonstrate, a solution that encompasses a 
compromise between the interests of both parties tends to be obeyed.  
Whether the compromise is Court issued or agreed upon through prior or 
subsequent cooperation of the parties is irrelevant.  States are always free to 
modify their rights through agreements, whether confirmed by adjudication 
152  In response to the subsequent agreement reached 
between Libya and Chad regarding the Aouzou Strip, ICJ President 
153  Thus, one cannot speak of noncompliance in 
cases where the parties jointly modify their legal relations following a 
judgment and thereby change a regime adjudicated upon by the Court.  
Compromise and cooperation attained at any stage in the dispute resolution 
process serves as a sufficient, and significant indicator of compliance. 
As discussed in the preceding section, there are some disputes in 
-interests are clearly in conflict.  Cooperation is a 
vital factor in ensuring compliance under such circumstances.  Consider 
Strip, in which the entire area was awarded to Chad.  Parties did not reach 
an agreement until subsequent negotiations occurred, after which Libya 
sion and the countries 
notified the United Nations that they had reached an agreement on 
                                                                                                                    
147 Territorial and Maritime Dispute Between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicar. v. 
Hond.) 2007 I.C.J. 659,  ¶ 321(4) (Oct. 8). 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Llamzon, supra note 2, at 833. 
151 Id. 
152 SCHULTE, supra note 9, at 274. 
153 Mohammed Bedjaoui, The Place of the International Court of Justice in the General System for the 
Maintenance of Peace, as Instituted by the Charter of the United Nations, I.C.J. YB 211 (1994-95). 
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implementation.154  As noted in the foregoing description of the case, a 
compromise with regard to the autonomy of the disputed land was not 
reached.  Nonetheless, Libya accepted the judgment.  Such acceptance 
relates back to the first factor discussed herein: when all else fails, political 
pressure will force a state to succumb to a judgment of the Court, even 
when doing so is less than advantageous.  
 
D . Internal Political Influence 
 
Internal pressure for a country to defy a judgment is present in 
political regime.  Whether such internal pressure will arise and impede 
successful implementation depends on the merits of the decision. 
 
1. Political Regime as an Excuse for Noncompliance 
 
boundary dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria, Nigeria pled its 
on for noncompliance with 
of the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon.155  Nigeria argued that its 
Constitution specified the area as territory of the nation of Nigeria and, as 
such, the federal government could not give up Bakassi until the requisite 
national and state assemblies amended the Constitution.156  This assertion 
was deemed moot based on the advanced agreement made by both 
countries to respect any decision ordained by the ICJ.157   
 
application of the Vienna Convention challenged the political regime of the 
United States and ultimately seemed to circumvent the trend toward 
compliance.  In 2001, the United States executed two German nationals 
without first informing either of their right to communicate with German 
consular officials.  In response, the ICJ required the United States to give 
Germany a general assurance that it would observe its obligations under the 
Vienna Convention going forward and would review and reconsider future 
convictions and sentences of German nationals sentenced to severe 
                                                                                                                    
154 Letter dated 13 Apr. 1994 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, UN Doc. S/1994/432, 33 I.L.M. 791 (1994). 
155 Cameroon: Bakassi : Why the ICJ Judgment is Unacceptable Government, AFRICA NEWS SERVICE, 
Oct. 24, 2002. available in Lexis, News Library, Allnews file.   
156 Id. 
157 Llamzon, supra note 2, at 838. 
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penalties.158  Despite having made Constitutional arguments against such 
obligations, the United States addressed the ICJ decision by setting up 
programs to promote understanding and observance of the Vienna 
Convention.159  Further, the United States Department of State called for 
coordinated with numerous federal agencies, as well as with states having 
160   
The ICJ imposed a similar final judgment against the United States 
three years later.  In that case, the Court ordered the U.S. to reconsider the 
sentences of Mexican nationals being held on death row.161 
final judgment further stated that the ongoing program employed by the 
United States to improve consular notification was adequate.162  The 
disposition of the case appeared to set a new tone for U.S. compliance with 
international obligations.163  However, the Bush administration 
subsequently withdrew the United States from the Optional Protocol of the 
Vienna Convention, on which the ICJ rulings were based.164  Nonetheless, 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case of Jose Medellin, a 
Mexican national who was sentenced to death in the state of Texas without 
ever having been advised of his right to contact the Mexican consulate.165  
The President then issued a memorandum to the Attorney General ordering 
166 by 
granting review to those foreign convicts who were not afforded consular 
notice in accordance with the Vienna Convention.167 The Supreme Court 
position, held that neither international treaty nor ICJ decisions are binding 
domestic law, and that, absent an act of Congress or Constitutional 
authority, the President of the United States lacks the power to enforce such 
treaties or decisions.168  
                                                                                                                    
158 Douglass Cassel, International Remedies in National Criminal Cases: ICJ Judgment in Germany v. 
United States, 15 LEIDEN INT L L 69 (2002). 
159 See Jen Guccione, On the Law New Weapon in Defense: Foreign Consulates, LA TIMES, 16 Nov. 
2001, at B2. 
160 Llamzon, supra note 2, at 840. 
161 See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 12 Judgment (Feb. 3). 
162 See id. ¶¶ 144-150. 
163 Id. 
164 Adam Liptak, U.S. Says It Has Withdrawn from World Judicial Body, NY TIMES, Mar. 10, 2005, at 
A16. 
165 Llamzon, supra note 2, at 842, n. 201. 
166 President George W. Bush, Memorandum for the Attorney General, Feb 28, 2005, available at 
http://www.whit 
ehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050228-18.html. 
167 Llamzon, supra note 2, at 842. 
168 Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 128 S.Ct. 1346 (2008) (No. 06-984). 
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The Supreme C Medellin v. Texas appears, at first 
glance, to render international obligations all but unenforceable in certain 
political regimes, like that of the United States.  However, the Supreme 
Court stopped short of any per se rule regarding enforcement of 
-by-
169  Under this approach, treaties and judgments do not 
automatic 170 but may be nonetheless 
enforceable.  In fact, the 
compliance with an international obligation,171 and perhaps goes so far as 
ntion to the 
that implementing such a law would be within U.S. Congressional 
authority.172   
It is too soon to tell what the ultimate effect of this holding will 
have on United States
certainly suggests that compliance is not only possible, but desired.  The 
ambiguity and suggested escape route for implementing compliance with 
international obligations like La Grand and Avena offers a remedy for the 
complex predicament in which a state aspires to comply but is bound by its 
own political regime. 
 
2. A Look at the Merits: International v. Domestic 
 
It is important to acknowledge that political regime and related 
principles of sovereignty do not always result in compliance problems.  As 
seen in the dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria, although political 
regime and autonomy have been asserted as excuses for noncompliance 
with judgments in the territorial or interpretive contexts, such claims are 
jurisdiction.173  Threats to compliance resulting from political regime most 
often appear in criminal matters, where a judgment issued by the ICJ is in 
conflict with some procedural a
system.174   
                                                                                                                    
169 Steve Charnovitz, Revitalizing the U .S. Compliance Power, 102(3) AJIL 551 (July 2008).  
170 Medellin, 552 U.S. at 1360. 
171 Charnovitz, supra note 169, at 559. 
172 Id. 
173 See Cameroon v. Nigeria, 2002 I.C.J. 303 (Oct. 10). 
174 See generally Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 12 Judgment (Feb. 3); 
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, supra note 42; LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 4 Judgment (June 
27); Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. 
& Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 1996 I.C.J. 595 (July 11). 
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Internal pressure to defy international judgments arises in matters 
by an order that requires or prohibits something that unequivocally 
diverges from requirements of its own legal system.  Whether a judgment 
the extent to which the matter is an international affair.  Modern era cases 
suggest that whether a criminal procedure issue constitutes an international 
matter depends on where the relevant conduct occurred domestically or on 
foreign soil. 
The dispute between Bosnia and Serbia addressed the prevention 
and punishment of the crime of genocide.175  The judgment ordered Serbia 
to arrest and try two of its citizens  an act that Serbia had not chosen to 
take on its own volition, but which it proceeded with upon order of the 
ICJ.176  Although the perpetrators were Serbian, the crimes for which their 
arrest and trial were demanded took place outside of Serbia.177  Because the 
crimes took place on foreign soil, and in light of the seriousness of the 
allegations, the dispute was undoubtedly international.  Similarly, in the 
case between Belgium and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the 
arrest warrant in dispute was issued by Belgium against a Foreign Minister 
not domiciled in Belgium, for crimes committed outside of its territory,178  
making its issuance clearly an international matter.  These cases suggest 
that judgments that concern primarily international affairs, as opposed to 
domestic matters, can be adjudicated internationally without the threat of 
noncompliance.   
The disputes presented in Avena and LaGrand, on the other hand, 
are not as explicitly international.  In both cases, the final judgments 
imposed by the ICJ required the United States to comply with procedural 
obligations for prisoners being held in U.S. facilities after being convicted 
in U.S. courts for crimes committed while on U.S. soil.179  The ICJ had 
jurisdiction over these disputes, as evidenced and acknowledged by the 
United States through its submission to the tribunal.  Such judgments pose 
a much greater threat to state autonomy, however, because they are far 
more detached internationally than those judgments regarding the crime of 
genocide or the punishment of individuals who committed crimes and are 
domiciled on foreign soil.  When a judgment presents such a direct 
                                                                                                                    
175 See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
1996 I.C.J. 595. 
176 Alexandra Hudson, Serbia Cleared of Genocide, REUTERS (Feb. 27, 2007), available at 
http://uk.reuters.com/a rticle/idUKL2525037520070227.   
177 Id.   
178 See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, supra note 42. 
179 See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, 2003 I.C.J. 12. 
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the risk of noncompliance will be greater.   
 
I I I . Assessment 
 
The cases considered in this paper can be divided into four topical 
categories:  territorial disputes over sovereignty,180 territorial disputes over 
a boundary line,181 criminal procedure issues,182 and disputes over 
interpretation.183 
The only interpretation case considered in this assessment  the 
Arbitral Award judgment issued between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal  
resulted in compliance.  That outcome was not problematic due to the 
external political influences and cooperation implicated merely by 
submitting the issue to the Court for resolution.  The act of submitting the 
case to the ICJ for interpretation following an order demonstrates 
reveals an acknowledgement of the reputation costs associated with defying 
the international community and its organizations.  It is no surprise, then, 
observed by both parties.  Because the submission of a prior award for 
deference to the international system, compliance in such cases, especially 
where cooperative efforts between the parties have been made, will be 
easily achieved. 
Territorial dispute judgments issued for the purpose of establishing 
a boundary line are followed so long as the boundary demarcated is not 
ambiguous.  An ambiguous decision may not affect the likelihood of 
compliance where the judgment is issued for the purpose of establishing 
sovereignty over a particular area and sufficient cooperative efforts take 
place between the states.  Likewise, where a sufficiently determinant 
boundary line is established, cooperative efforts can act as a means for 
successful enforcement.184  Cooperation as a means for effectuating an 
ambiguous delimitation, however, is less practical.  Whereas good faith 
negotiations may act as a means to relieve ambiguities in a sovereignty 
judgment,185 the problems for enforcement posed by ambiguity in 
                                                                                                                    
180 See Appendix C, Table 1, C-1. 
181 See id. at Table 2, C-1. 
182 See id. at Table 3, C-2. 
183 See id. at Table 4, C-2. 
184 See, e.g., Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. 
Norway), 1993 I.C.J. 38 (June 14). 
185 See, e.g., Territorial and Maritime Dispute Between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea 
(Nicar. v. Hond.) 2007 I.C.J. 659 (Oct. 8). 
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delimitation orders are often not related to autonomy principles, but rather 
to uncertainty and misunderstanding.186  Ambiguous boundaries or 
instructions leave parties with little guidance as to how to proceed, which 
acts as a barrier to compliance and to future negotiations, even when 
proceeding in good faith.187 
Parties comply with territorial dispute judgments establishing 
sovereignty over a particular area when the judgment is not in direct 
conflict with the self-interests of one or more of the parties.188  It does not 
follow, however, that awards of sovereignty that directly conflict with a 
-interest will always pose problems for compliance.  Whether a 
state will disobey an order depends primarily on the relationship of the 
parties involved.  In cases where the parties to the dispute have an amicable 
relationship and engage in close relations, compliance is not threatened by 
a conflict of self-interest.189  Alternatively, where there is a history of 
hostility and militarized conflict between disputing parties, the party 
disadvantaged by the award will be resistant to accept it.190  In each dispute 
where compliance was achieved despite conflicts to self-interest, there 
existed good relations and a shared mutual interest that served to be 
benefited by resolution.191  A shared mutual interest did not have the same 
effect in preventing defiance where relations were hostile.192  Conflicting 
self-interest principles also do not appear to have an effect on compliance 
with judgments establishing boundary lines.193  Parties comply with 
delimitation decisions, so long as they are unambiguous, regardless of 
whether they are conflicting in nature. 
Internal pressure to defy a judgment emerges when an order 
al regime.  Political regime 
and autonomy may be asserted as an excuse for noncompliance with 
judgments in the territorial or interpretive contexts, but such claims are 
194  
                                                                                                                    
186 See, e.g., Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.), 1992 I.C.J. 348 (Sep. 11). 
187 See, e.g., id.; -Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25). 
188 Compare, e.g., Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment (Apr. 20, 2010), 
and Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/ 
Singapore) 2008 I.C.J. 12 (May 23), and Territorial and Maritime Dispute Between Nicaragua and 
Honduras in the Caribbean Sea 2007 I.C.J. 659 (Oct. 8), with Cameroon v. Nigeria, 2002 I.C.J. 303 
(Oct. 10), Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 3). 
189 See, e.g., Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia/ Malaysia), 2002 I.C.J. 625 
Judgment (Dec. 17); Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots./Namib.), (Dec. 13, 1999) Judgment.   
190 See, e.g., Cameroon v. Nigeria, 2002 I.C.J. 303; Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 
3). 
191 See, e.g., Indonesia/ Malaysia, 2002 I.C.J. 625; Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots./Namib.), (Dec. 13, 
1999).   
192 Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 3). 
193 See, e.g., Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Rom. v. Ukr.), Judgment (Feb. 3, 2009). 
194 See Cameroon v. Nigeria, 2002 I.C.J. 303. 
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Conflicts most often appear in criminal matters, where a judgment issued 
system.195  
will be met with defiance depends on the extent to which the matter is an 
international affair.  Modern era cases suggest that whether an issue is 
sufficiently international depends on whether the relevant conduct occurred 
domestically or on foreign soil.  If a judgment is a primarily international 
affair, as opposed to a domestic matter, it can be adjudicated internationally 
without threat of defiance.  
 
I V . Continuing the trend toward compliance 
 
As this paper demonstrates, the tendency of states in the modern 
era is to comply with decisions handed down by the ICJ.  The risk of 
defiance arises predominantly in two instances.  First, when a sovereignty 
-interest is issued under 




A. External Political Influence as an Enforcer of International 
Judgments 
 
In the first instance, external political influences will compel an 
initially defiant state to comply.  Pressure from the international 
community and the presence of international organizations increase 
reputation costs for defiant states and thus produce compliance, even where 
-interest and where relations 
between parties are hostile.  As demonstrated herein, even in those 
sovereignty disputes where a state was openly critical or publicly 
disavowed a judgment, subsequent pressure from the international 
community forced compliance.   
Pressure from the international community raises the risk of 
consequential penalties, both regionally and internationally, for disobedient 
states, and leaves parties with few alternatives but to comply.  The 
substantial reputational risks associated with noncompliance force 
dissatisfied parties to accept judgments, often turning to international 
organizations as a means for negotiating measures to be taken to satisfy the 
                                                                                                                    
195 See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 12 Judgment (Feb. 3); Arrest 
Warrant of 11 April 2000, supra note 42; LaGrand (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 4 Judgment (June 27); 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & 
Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 1996 I.C.J. 595 (July 11). 
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expected for all parties to the dispute.  Pressure from the international 
community coupled with active efforts by international organizations thus 
acts as an enforcement mechanism for international judgments by raising 
the reputation costs of defiance and offering protection and mediation for 
disputing parties.   
These external political influences legitimize international decrees 
and the power of the international regime.  Each time a judgment is issued, 
whether it is met with compliance or initial noncompliance, the presence of 
external political influences work to further inaugurate and stabilize the 
international system.  As decisions continue to be implemented, whether 
independently or in response to external pressure, the international law 
regime gains authority.  Continuing this trend over time will further 
establish international law, sustain international order, and promote the 
legitimacy of the international regime. 
 
B. Establishing International Boundaries 
 
In the latter instance, where a judgment regarding a primarily 
domestic mat
sovereignty and autonomy principles will pose problems for compliance.  
The same risk of defiance does not occur, however, when the issue is 
sufficiently international.  This discrepancy exposes the principal quandary 
plaguing the international law regime as a whole:  the authority of a 
peripheral body of law to control individually autonomous states. 
In cases that are truly international  for example, disputes 
involving sovereignty over a particular area or the procedure to be followed 
when engaging in relations that cross state lines  judgments are met with 
sovereignty, the matter in dispute is international by its very nature and 
cannot be settled by the will of one state without the consent or cooperation 
of the other.  It should be no surprise then, that states are willing to forfeit 
some autonomy to an international tribunal in cases where the tribunal is 
clearly better suited to arbitrate the dispute and implement a solution.  It 
should likewise be no surprise that a state will be less likely to forfeit its 
autonomy to an international tribunal when the matter being adjudicated is 
primarily domestic in nature  for example, orders pertaining to domestic 
acts that are to be carried out domestically and are in conflict with the 
domestic system currently in place.  External political influence may still 
provide states with an incentive to comply in such cases and states may, in 
fact, portray an appearance of compliance for that purpose.  However, such 
a representation will often be unauthentic, as the state is not truly willing to 
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 or feels procedurally barred from  surrendering its sovereignty to such 
an extent. 
Luckily, international judgments regarding primarily domestic 
conduct are rare.  Most disputes adjudicated by the ICJ are sufficiently 
international to necessitate international arbitration.  Where a matter seems 
to be questionably domestic, the ICJ should be cautious in its adjudication 
of the dispute.  Impositions on conduct that is not sufficiently international 
poses a direct conflict to state sovereignty and indirect problems for the 
international regime as well.  External political influences have done much 
to police international conduct and establish a regime in which 
international law and order are practical and accepted.  The questionable 
infringements on state sovereignty can act to deter that development by 
bringing to the forefront the circumstances that pose the largest threat to 
international authority and make states most apprehensive to submit to the 
 
The international law system is a regime based on the consent of 
the sovereign, and states are willing to consent to that regime for a price.  
That is, states are willing to forfeit some sovereignty to an international 
system, even if not in their best interest, in return for the safeguard of an 
international body to manage and protect international relations effectively.  
That exchange is threatened, however, where an international body 
that which the state will not  or, under its own legal precepts cannot  
consent.  In order to maintain the trend toward compliance and to continue 
establishing the legitimacy of the international regime, the ICJ needs to 
 




Decisions of the International Court of Justice have been met with 
substantial compliance in the modern era.  Direct, defiant noncompliance, 
where a state deliberately and ceaselessly rejects a decision of the Court 
and refuses to implement its judgment, has not occurred in any case.  In 
cases where noncompliance has been present, the noncompliant behavior 
has been fleeting or slight.   
Pressure from the international community and the presence of 
international organizations raise the reputation costs associated with 
noncompliance, thereby minimizing the risk of disobedience with 
judgments.  Defiant noncompliance occurs where a judgment is in discord 
-interest or threatens its autonomous regime.  Problems 
for implementation may also occur where judgments are ambiguous, but 
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such complications are not a result of defiance.  Instances of 
noncompliance can be cured if the subject matter is sufficiently 
international and there is ample external political pressure, especially 
where the presence of a mutually shared interest, a close relationship, or an 
definitive solution.  Judgments that entail compromise or allow for 
cooperative efforts are more easily implemented, regardless of whether the 
compromise is designated by 
achieved through subsequent cooperation between the parties. 
In order to continue the trend toward compliance, international 
organizations and the international community must continue to act as 
enforcers of international decisions by exerting pressure on defiant parties 
and raising reputation costs associated with noncompliance.  Further, the 
international law regime must remain a system of sovereign states 
operating on a theory of consent in which a proper balance is achieved 
between the sovereignty sacrificed and the international safeguards secured 
as a result. 
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Appendix A 






















2004 02-03-2009 Romania v. Ukraine 
 
Maritime Delimitation in 




(boundary line)  
 
2003 05-23-2008 Malaysia/ Singapore Sovereignty over Pedra 
Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, 







2003 03-31-2004 Mexico v. United 
States of America 
  




2002 07-12-2005 Benin/Niger 
 




2000 02-14-2002 Democratic Republic of 
the Congo v. Belgium  






1999 10-08-2007 Nicaragua v. Honduras Territorial and Maritime 
Dispute between 
Nicaragua and Honduras 







1999 06-21-2007 Germany v. United 




1998 10-23-2001 Indonesia/ Malaysia Sovereignty over Pulau 








1996 12-13-1999 Botswana/ Namibia 
 









Land and Maritime 
Boundary between 





1993 09-25-1997 Hungary/Slovakia -Nagymaros Territorial 
  





1993 07-11-1996 Bosnia and Herzegovina 
v. Serbia and 
Montenegro 
 
Application of the 
Convention on the 
Prevention and 





1991 07-01-1994 Qatar v. Bahrain Maritime Delimitation 




1990 02-03-1994 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/ 
Chad 
 





1989 11-12-1991 Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal 
 





1988 06-14-1993 Denmark v. Norway Maritime Delimitation in 
the Area between 






1986 09-13-1992  El Salvador/ Honduras: 
Nicaragua intervening 
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Appendix B 












Reason for Exclusion: 
2010 Burkina Faso/Niger 
 
Frontier Dispute Case is still pending 
2010 Australia v. Japan 
 
Whaling in the Antarctic Case is still pending 
2009 Belgium v. 
Switzerland 
Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement of Judgments 
in Civil and Commercial 
Matters 
 
Case is still pending 




Case is still pending 
2008 Germany v. Italy Jurisdictional Immunities 
of the State 
 
Case is still pending 
2008 Former Yugoslav 
Republic of 
Macedonia v. Greece 
 
Application of the Interim 
Accord of 13 September 
1995 
 
Case is still pending 
2008 Georgia v. Russian 
Federation  
Application of the 
International Convention 
on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 
 
Case is still pending 
2008 Ecuador v. Colombia Aerial Herbicide Spraying 
 
Case is still pending 
2008  Peru v. Chile Maritime Dispute 
 
Case is still pending 
2006  Commonwealth 
of Dominica v. 
Switzerland 
 
Status vis-à-vis the Host 
State of a Diplomatic 
Envoy to the United 
Nations 
Case is still pending 
2006  Djibouti v. 
France 
Certain Questions of 
Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters 
 
Judgment is not one in 
which compliance can be 
evaluated 




Navigational and Related 
Rights 
 
There has not been 
sufficient time to adjudge 
compliance since Judgment 
on July 13, 2009 
 
2003 Republic of the 
Congo v. France 
 
Certain Criminal 
Proceedings in France 
Case is still pending 
2002 Democratic Republic 
of the Congo v. 
Armed Activities on the 
Territory of the Congo  
Case was discontinued 
without any prior judgment 
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Application for Revision of 
the Judgment of 11 
September 1992 in the 
Case concerning the Land, 
Island and Maritime 
Frontier Dispute  
 
Claim was rejected on the 
basis of lack of jurisdiction 
or admissibility 
 
2001 Nicaragua v. 
Colombia 





Judgment is not one in 
which compliance can be 
evaluated 
 
2001 Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. 
Yugoslavia 
Application for Revision of 
the Judgment of 11 July 
1996 in the Case 
concerning Application of 
the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide   
 
Claim was rejected on the 
basis of lack of jurisdiction 
or admissibility 
 
2001 Liechtenstein v. 
Germany 
Certain Property Claim was rejected on the 
basis of lack of jurisdiction 
or admissibility 
 
1999 Croatia v. Serbia Application of the 
Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide 
 
Judgment has been made 
regarding jurisdiction, but 
no Judgment has been 
made on the merits 
 
1999 Yugoslavia v. United 
States of America 
Legality of Use of Force Claim was rejected on the 
basis of lack of jurisdiction 
or admissibility 
 
1999 Yugoslavia v. Spain Legality of Use of Force Claim was rejected on the 
basis of lack of jurisdiction 
or admissibility 
 
1999 Serbia and 
Montenegro v. United 
Kingdom 
 
Legality of Use of Force Claim was rejected on the 
basis of lack of jurisdiction 
or admissibility 
 




Legality of Use of Force Claim was rejected on the 
basis of lack of jurisdiction 
or admissibility 
 




Legality of Use of Force Claim was rejected on the 
basis of lack of jurisdiction 
or admissibility 
 
1999 Serbia and 
Montenegro v. Italy 
 
Legality of Use of Force Claim was rejected on the 
basis of lack of jurisdiction 
or admissibility 
 
1999 Serbia and 
Monténégro v. 
Legality of Use of Force Claim was rejected on the 
basis of lack of jurisdiction 
  





1999 Serbia and 
Montenegro v. France 
 
Legality of Use of Force Claim was rejected on the 
basis of lack of jurisdiction 
or admissibility 
 




Legality of Use of Force Claim was rejected on the 
basis of lack of jurisdiction 
or admissibility 
 
1999 Pakistan v. India Aerial Incident of 10 
August 1999 
Claim was rejected on 





Republic of the 
Congo v. Uganda 
Armed Activities on the 
Territory of the Congo 
Case was discontinued 
without any prior 
judgment on the merits 
 
1998 Republic of 
Guinea v. 
Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo 
 
Ahmadou Sadio Diallo Compliance may not yet 
be evaluated  
1998 Cameroon v. 
Nigeria 
Request for 
Interpretation of the 
Judgment of 11 June 
1998 in the Case 
concerning the Land 
and Maritime Boundary 
between Cameroon and 
Nigeria 
 
Claim was rejected on 




1995 Spain v. Canada Fisheries Jurisdiction Claim was rejected on 
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1992 Islamic Republic 
of Iran v. United 
States of America 
Oil Platforms  Claim was rejected with 
no positive statement 
beyond that rejection 
could possibly imply a 
duty of acceptance and 
implementation (the 
not trigger an 
obligation of 
compliance because the 
Court ultimately did not 
find a  breach) 
 
1992 Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya v. 




Application of the 1971 
Montreal Convention 
arising from the Aerial 
Incident at Lockerbie 
 
Case was removed from 
the Court's list at the 
joint request of the 
parties 





Application of the 1971 
Montreal Convention 
arising from the Aerial 
Incident at Lockerbie 
 
Case was removed from 
the Court's list at the 
joint request of the 
parties 
1991 Portugal v. 
Australia 
East Timor Claim was rejected on 




1989 Nauru v. Australia Certain Phosphate 
Lands in Nauru 
Case was discontinued 
without any prior 
judgment on the merits 
 
1987 United States of 
America v. Italy 
Elettronica Sicula 
S.p.A. (ELSI) 
Claim was rejected with 
no positive statement 
beyond that rejection 
could possibly imply a 
duty of acceptance and 
implementation (the 
applicant lost on the 
basis of substantive 
law) 
 
1986 Nicaragua v. 
Honduras 
Border and Transborder 
Armed Actions 
Case was discontinued 
without any prior 
judgment on the merits 
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Appendix C 
COMPLIANCE BY CATEGORY 
 
 





Argentina v. Uruguay (Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay) 
 
Yes Yes 
Malaysia/ Singapore (Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu 
Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge) 
 
Yes Yes 




Botswana/ Namibia (Kasikili/Sedudu Island) 
 
Yes Yes 
Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening (Land and 
Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria) 
 
No Yes 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/ Chad (Territorial Dispute) 
 
No Yes 
Table 2. Territorial Disputes (boundary line) 
 
*Compliance is difficult to ascertain as a result of ambiguity in the requirements of 
the decision. 





Romania v. Ukraine (Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea) 
  
Yes Yes 
 Benin/Niger (Frontier Dispute) 
 
Yes Yes 
Nicaragua v. Honduras (Territorial and Maritime Dispute between 





Yes * Yes * 
Qatar v. Bahrain (Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions 
between Qatar and Bahrain) 
 
Yes Yes 
Denmark v. Norway (Maritime Delimitation in the Area between 
Greenland and Jan Mayen) 
 
Yes Yes  
 El Salvador/ Honduras: Nicaragua intervening (Land, Island and 
Maritime Frontier Dispute) 
Yes * Yes * 
  




 Mexico v. United States of America (Avena and 
Other Mexican Nationals) 
  
Yes No 
Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium (Arrest 
Warrant of 11 April 2000) 
Yes Yes 
 
 Germany v. United States of America (LaGrand) 
  
Yes Yes 
Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro 
(Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
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Argentina v. Uruguay (Pulp Mills on the 
River Uruguay) 
 
   + +    +  
 Romania v. Ukraine (Maritime 
Delimitation in the Black Sea) 
 
     +  N
E 
+  
Malaysia/ Singapore (Sovereignty over 
Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle 
Rocks and South Ledge) 
 
  + +     +  
 Mexico v. United States of America 
(Avena and Other Mexican Nationals) 
  
+ + +       - 
 Benin/Niger (Frontier Dispute) 
  
 +         
Democratic Republic of the Congo v. 
Belgium (Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000) 
 
 + +       N
E 
Nicaragua v. Honduras (Territorial and 
Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and 
Honduras in the Caribbean Sea) 
 
      N
E 
 +  
 Germany v. United States of America 
(LaGrand) 
  
+ + +       N
E 
Indonesia/ Malaysia (Sovereignty over Pulau 
Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan) 
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Botswana/ Namibia (Kasikili/Sedudu Island) 
 
+   + +   N
E 
  
Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea 
intervening (Land and Maritime Boundary 
between Cameroon and Nigeria) 
 




+ + + +   -    
Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and 
Montenegro (Application of the Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide) 
 
+ + +       N
E 
Qatar v. Bahrain (Maritime Delimitation and 
Territorial Questions) 
 
   +  +   +  
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/ Chad (Territorial 
Dispute) 
 
+  + +  +  - +  
Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal (Arbitral Award 
of 31 July 1989) 
 
+ + +      +  
Denmark v. Norway (Maritime Delimitation 
in the Area between Greenland and Jan 
Mayen) 
 
   +     +  
El Salvador/ Honduras: Nicaragua 
intervening (Land, Island and Maritime 
Frontier Dispute) 
 + +   + -    
14%
15%
15%
12%
3%
9%
5%
9%
10%
8%
Pressure  from  Int'l
Community
Presence  of  IOs
Reputation  Costs
Shared  Interests
Close  Relations
Militarized  Conflict
Determinacy  of  Decision
Conflicting  Self-­‐Interests
Principles
Compromise/Cooperatio
n
